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Goal-directed behavior is a fundamental means by which animals can flexibly solve the
challenges posed by variable external and internal conditions. Recently, the processes
and brain mechanisms underlying such behavior have been extensively studied from
behavioral, neuroscientific and computational perspectives. This research has highlighted
the processes underlying goal-directed behavior and associated brain systems including
prefrontal cortex, basal ganglia and, in particular therein, the nucleus accumbens (NAcc).
This paper focusses on one particular process at the core of goal-directed behavior:
how motivational value is assigned to goals on the basis of internal states and
environmental stimuli, and how this supports goal selection processes. Various biological
and computational accounts have been given of this problem and of related multiple neural
and behavior phenomena, but we still lack an integrated hypothesis on the generation and
use of value for goal selection. This paper proposes an hypothesis that aims to solve
this problem and is based on this key elements: (a) amygdala and hippocampus establish
the motivational value of stimuli and goals; (b) prefrontal cortex encodes various types
of action outcomes; (c) NAcc integrates different sources of value, representing them in
terms of a common currency with the aid of dopamine, and thereby plays a major role in
selecting action outcomes within prefrontal cortex. The “goals” pursued by the organism
are the outcomes selected by these processes. The hypothesis is developed in the context
of a critical review of relevant biological and computational literature which offer it support.
The paper shows how the hypothesis has the potential to integrate existing interpretations
of motivational value and goal selection.
Keywords: goal-directed Behavior, goal selection, value, novelty, amygdala, hippocampus, nucleus accumbens,
prefrontal cortex
1. INTRODUCTION
Instrumental learning—the process of acquiring the capacity to
select actions based on the utility of their outcomes—is a funda-
mental means through which animals adapt to changes in their
environment. These changes may be profound, as the ecologi-
cal niches occupied by animals can vary substantially during the
life of a single individual. For example, the superficially straight-
forward behaviors of foraging, escaping predators, and searching
for con-specifics, must be flexible and dynamically adjust to con-
tinuously changing environmental conditions. Moreover, action
selection processes have to flexibly adjust on the basis of internal
states and needs of the animal, as these continuously change in
the course of the day. Only when there are strong invariances in
the contingencies between action and valuable outcomes, based
on reliable environmental and internal processes, behavior can
become more regular or habitual. When this is not possible, the
selection of instrumental actions is based on the current value of
action outcomes, or goals (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998). Here
we use the term goal to indicate the internal representation of
an action outcome currently chosen as the target of the animal’s
behavior because of the incentive salience, or motivational value,
associated with the outcome. Incentive salience has been defined
as a motivational attribute that the brain assigns to stimuli if
these are related to the possible satisfaction of some of the ani-
mal’s homeostatic drives (Berridge, 2004; we shall see how our
hypothesis expands the concept of motivational value to include
value related to the novelty of outcomes). The theory proposed
here is hence relevant for decisions that involve the selection of
action goals on the basis of their current value for the animal, in
particular “ultimate goals” consisting in the achievement or inter-
action with items having an intrinsic biologically saliency (e.g.,
food, water, and novel objects). When behavior is sensitive to the
value assigned to goals and to the contingencies between goals and
actions that can accomplish them, it is referred to as goal-directed
behavior (Dickinson and Balleine, 1994; Balleine and Dickinson,
1998).
The processes and neural mechanisms through which the
brain generates and assigns motivational incentive salience to
goals is an important open problem for current neuroscientific
research: this paper addresses this issue by first offering a crit-
ical review of the relevant literature, and then by proposing a
novel hypothesis to solve it. The biological literature indicates that
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goal-directed behavior rests on the acquisition of two key types of
associations: first, the associations between actions and their out-
comes which have to be learned so that the animal can choose
actions when their outcomes become desirable (Balleine and
Dickinson, 1998; Yin and Knowlton, 2006); second, the associa-
tions between the outcomes and their current motivational value
(Balleine and Dickinson, 1998; Balleine and Killcross, 2006; Yin
and Knowlton, 2006; Balleine and Ostlund, 2007). Instrumental
behaviors that do not rely on these two classes of associations
are deemed habitual, being solely based on associations between
stimuli and responses (S-R; Balleine and Dickinson, 1998; Yin
and Knowlton, 2006).
The neural substrates underlying goal-directed and habit-
ual behavior have been extensively investigated, and several
key neural systems have been shown to be involved. These
include the basal ganglia, a set of subcortical nuclei which
form looped circuits with cortex and thalamus. The main input
nucleus to the basal ganglia is the striatum, which may be
partitioned, on an anatomical basis, into dorsolateral, dorso-
medial and ventral territories. It is the ventral striatum, oth-
erwise known as nucleus accumbens (NAcc), which forms a
focus of the paper. The accumbens is further divided into two
major sub-components: the “core” and the “shell.” Other key
areas for goal-directed behavior include the limbic structures
such as the amygdala and hippocampus. The amygdala is a
brain system that, along with others (e.g., hypothalamus), helps
homeostatic regulation of internal bodily organs (e.g., heart
rate and blood pressure) and of the neuromodulators in the
brain, and affects the triggering of innate behaviors such as
orienting and approach. Hippocampus is a highly-associative
multimodal part of the “paleocortex” (phylogenetically older
than neocortex) and is strongly connected with all associative
cortical areas; it plays an important role in episodic memory,
consolidation of long-term memory, and higher-level cognition
(e.g., planning).
While the anatomical identity of these key structures has been
established, there is, as yet, no complete picture of their opera-
tion in behavioral expression, although some broad functional
separation can be made. Thus, it appears that habitual behav-
ior, and related learning processes, are rooted in the circuits
involving the dorsolateral striatum and motor cortex (Packard
and Knowlton, 2002; Yin et al., 2004). In contrast, goal-directed
behavior relies on the networks including prefrontal cortex, dor-
somedial striatum, andNAcc portions of basal ganglia, and limbic
neural structures such as amygdala and hippocampus (Corbit
et al., 2001; Yin et al., 2005).
Recently, the theoretical work on these issues has been cor-
roborated by studies based on computational models and formal
analyses. In particular, several concepts of the reinforcement
learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998) and optimal control theory
have been exploited to formally capture various features and dif-
ferences of goal-directed and habitual instrumental behavior. For
example, in a seminal paper, Daw et al. (2005) proposed that
habitual behavior and its learning can be captured on the basis
of model-free reinforcement learning, whereas the functionalities
involved in goal-directed behavior can be represented through
model-based reinforcement learning.
Within this framework, a key role has been ascribed to the
NAcc in terms of processing of current values and reward predic-
tions (Humphries and Prescott, 2010; Bornstein and Daw, 2011;
Penner and Mizumori, 2011; Pennartz et al., 2011; Khamassi and
Humphries, 2012). However, the role played by the NAcc in the
interaction between values and outcomes has not been fully clar-
ified. The NAcc, in synergy with amygdala, has been shown to
play an important role also in Pavlovian (classical conditioning)
processes, responsible for assigning value to previously neutral
stimuli (Corbit et al., 2001; Cardinal et al., 2002b; Day et al., 2006;
Day and Carelli, 2007; Yin et al., 2008; Lex and Hauber, 2010;
Mannella et al., 2010). These processes have also been shown to
produce “energizing” effects on instrumental behavior, e.g., caus-
ing lever pressing with higher strength and frequency, based on
the value assigned to the stimulus (this phenomenon is known as
“Pavlovian to Instrumental Transfer”—PIT; Corbit et al., 2001;
Hall et al., 2001; Corbit and Balleine, 2011). Notwithstanding
this evidence, the key contribution of NAcc to assign value to
goals in goal-directed processes has not been fully spelled out.
Furthermore, while the contribution of the amygdala-accumbens
system is known to be important when appetitive and aversive
motivational values are involved, a possible role of the hippocam-
pal projection to accumbens in supplying goal-value has still not
been clarified. It is known that the hippocampus plays a key role
in goal processing (Pennartz et al., 2011) and also in the detec-
tion of the salience of stimuli based on their novelty (Lisman and
Grace, 2005).
Our account seeks to unify these observations under the idea
that NAcc serves to integrate different types of value sources used
to select goals. This perspective will specify and articulate in a new
way the classic idea that the NAcc acts as an interface between
“the limbic system and the motor system” of brain (Mogenson
et al., 1980). In particular, in this paper we propose an inte-
grated system-level hypothesis to explain how various types of
motivational values are transferred to goals via the NAcc, and
how goals, in turn, control instrumental behavior. The hypoth-
esis also explains the role played by the projections of amygdala
and hippocampus to NAcc in defining different types of value, in
particular values related to appetitive, aversive, and novel stimuli
(although we will deal with aversive stimuli only marginally).
The basic idea is that Pavlovian processes in amygdala, and
novelty-detection processes in hippocampus, are capable of
assigning motivational value to biologically relevant stimuli and
events. TheNAcc collects information onmotivational value from
disparate sources and encodes it in an integrated way in the “com-
mon currency” of its activity. This information is then used, via
ventral basal ganglia connectivity to prefrontal cortex, to select
among possible future goals encoded there. Further, we propose
twomechanisms for this. The first involves accumbens core which
contributes to goal selection with the same mechanisms used by
other striatal territories to make selections: competition between
alternative options and disinhibition of thalamic targets (in this
case representing goals), by basal ganglia output nuclei. In con-
trast, a second mechanism involving accumbens shell exploits
its strong connections with the dopaminergic system to make
goal selection “promiscuous.” That is, increased dopamine (DA)
in accumbens shell makes selection possible with smaller input
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salience. This “softer” selection scheme may have two possible
functions. First, it could foster goal exploration during learning
phases and the parallel selection of multiple related goals and
sub-goals during exploitation. Second, it could support a more
effective summation of the value of outcomes, and hence a bet-
ter comparison of them, when multiple sources of such value are
available at the same time.
Cortex also encodes actions required to bring about the
selected goals, and the associations between outcomes and actions
that allow the selected goals to activate the representations of spe-
cific actions. These are internal models, specifically inverse mod-
els (action-to-outcome), usable for action deployment (Gurney
et al., 2012). The action representations excited by goals through
inverse models are subject to selection via basal ganglia, so allow-
ing their behavioral expression and hence the achievement of the
goals that activated them.
The rest of the paper expands the hypothesis as follows.
Section 2 presents a focussed review of some main bio-behavioral
neuroscientific proposals and computational models aiming to
explain the learning and expression of goal-directed behavior.
Based on this, section 3 first presents an evolutionary interpre-
tation of the functions and neural structures underlying goal-
directed behavior: this is a framework within which we develop
the core hypothesis proposed here. The section continues by
explaining the neural basis of the hypothesis. In particular it
describes the three main components of the hypothesis: (1) the
amygdala and hippocampus as the sources of motivational value,
(2) the ventral basal ganglia (including NAcc) as the sub-system
integrating motivational-value information and selecting goals
on this basis, (3) the prefrontal cortex as the main compo-
nent representing and predicting outcomes, and triggering the
execution of actions that lead to these outcomes, based on action-
outcome contingency representations. Finally, section 4 draws
conclusions, in particular highlighting how the proposed hypoth-
esis reconciles most functions attributed in the literature to NAcc.
The acronyms used in the paper are listed in Table A1.
2. GOAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIOR: CURRENT BIOLOGICAL AND
COMPUTATIONAL FRAMEWORKS
2.1. GOAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIOR: KEY FUNCTIONAL PROCESSES
The definition of goal-directed behavior is based on two behav-
ioral effects and the experimental paradigms to investigate them,
namely contingency degradation and instrumental devaluation.
In a typical contingency degradation experiment (e.g., Balleine and
Dickinson, 1998) an animal first learns to produce an instrumen-
tal action (e.g., a lever press) to obtain a reward (e.g., a food
pellet). After this training the same reward is presented to the
animal independently of the production of the action, so degrad-
ing the correlation (“contingency”) between the performance of
the action and the experience of its outcome. After the contin-
gency degradation, the animal exhibits a lower probability of
performing the instrumental action. These results indicate that,
throughout the instrumental training, the animal learns and con-
tinuously updates the association between action and outcome.
This association is then used to select the current action based on
the chosen outcome. In a typical instrumental devaluation exper-
iment (e.g., Balleine and Dickinson, 1998) an animal first learns
to obtain two rewards (e.g., a food pellet and a sucrose solution)
via two instrumental actions (e.g., pressing a lever and pulling a
chain). Then one of the rewards is devalued, for example by let-
ting the animal freely access it until satiation. In a subsequent
test where both manipulanda (lever and chain) are presented
together “in extinction”—that is without rewards—the animal
tends to perform with lower probability the instrumental action
corresponding to the devalued outcome.
Together, the experiments of contingency degradation and
devaluation capture the core functional processes behind goal-
directed behavior. Figure 1 summarizes the main ideas in the
literature related to the interpretation of the mechanisms under-
lying these processes and their relation to S-R/habitual behaviors
(e.g., see Dickinson and Balleine, 1994; Balleine and Dickinson,
1998; Cardinal et al., 2002a). We now illustrate these processes in
detail.
The first set of processes involve the attribution of value
to stimuli during consummatory behaviors (related to “liking”
Berridge, 2004). These processes have overt behavioral mani-
festations and, according to the literature, might be related to
mechanisms that are responsible for the attribution of value to
outcomes in goal directed behavior. The second class of phenom-
ena involve the complex processes behind goal-directed behavior
(Dickinson and Balleine, 1994; Balleine and Dickinson, 1998).
These processes are related to the representation of the asso-
ciations between action representations and outcome represen-
tations (instrumental contingency) investigated in contingency
degradation experiments. These mechanisms are also related to
the attribution of incentive value to outcomes and the conse-
quent recall of suitable motor responses—the processes investi-
gated in devaluation experiments. The third class of phenomena
is related to Pavlovian processes, involving the core associations
between conditioned stimuli (CS) and unconditioned stimuli
(US; Cardinal et al., 2002a). TheUS have a value depending on the
animal’s internal states. Pavlovian processes can directly trigger
unlearned behaviors (e.g., as in conditioned approach experi-
ments) or influence the performance of instrumental behaviors
(Pavlovian-Instrumental Transfer—PIT; Corbit et al., 2007).
If instrumental actions are repeated a great number of times
in constant conditions (“overtraining”) the behavior tends to
become insensitive to the value of goals (McDonald and White,
1993; Yin and Knowlton, 2006). In this case, the associations
between the perceived stimulus/overall context and the produced
responses (S-R) are so strongly encoded that behavior becomes
habitual, i.e., mainly guided by external stimuli alone.
We will show that, with respect to the views described above,
our hypothesis presents three important new ideas. First, it pro-
poses that aside from appetitive value, driving both instrumental
and Pavlovian processes (and originating mainly from amygdala–
Amg), a second important source of value is used to select goals,
namely, “intrinsic value” related to the novelty of stimuli, and
originating from the hippocampus (Hip). Second, it specifies the
mechanisms of attribution of value to goals, in particular, spelling
out the mechanisms through which value is generated and con-
tributes to goal selection. Third, it highlights the importance of
the representation of “inverse models” (where the activation of a
goals/outcomes triggers the recall of actions) instead of the more
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FIGURE 1 | The major associations and processes behind instrumental
habitual behavior, goal-directed behavior, Pavlovian processes, and
their relations (here we describe only those relevant for this work). At
the top, the diagram shows the systems processing the hedonic impact and
the incentive value of stimuli, the latter important for the assignment of
value to appetitive/aversive stimuli involved in goal-directed processes. The
middle of the diagram shows the loop of processes involving goal-directed
behavior; here the action representations are associated with outcome
representations (instrumental contingency) and then these outcomes are
attributed incentive value. In this way, outcomes can trigger the execution
of motor responses that lead to them. The bottom of the diagram refers to
Pavlovian processes, with the core association between conditioned stimuli
(CS) to unconditioned stimuli (US). These have a certain value depending on
the animal’s internal states. Pavlovian processes can directly trigger
unlearned behaviors (e.g., as in conditioned approach experiments) or
influence the performance of instrumental behaviors (Pavlovian-Instrumental
Transfer—PIT). The diagram also represents the formation of habits (S-R
behaviors) as direct associations between stimuli (CS) and motor responses.
Reprinted from Cardinal et al. (2002a), Copyright 2002, with permission
from Elsevier.
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usually emphasized “forward” or “prediction models” (where
the information flow goes from “instrumental action representa-
tions” to “instrumental outcome,” see Figure 1); see Gurney et al.
(2012), on the distinction between the two types of models.
Recently, Gruber and McDonald (2012) have proposed an
integrated theory on the brain system underlying goal-directed
behavior dealing with some of the ideas described above. This
theory has some similarities with, but also important differ-
ences from, our proposal (Figure 2). As we do here, Gruber and
McDonald (2012) relate the dorsolateral striatum (DLS, in rats;
“putamen” in primates) to habits and sensorimotor behavior.
However, in contrast to our theory, the main processes involved
in goal selection are ascribed to the dorsomedial striatum (DMS,
in rats; “caudatum” in primates) and not to the NAcc. The lat-
ter is, instead, supposed to implement supportive functions such
as the regulation of “energization” or “vigor” of the performed
behaviors, and the triggering of behaviors which are ancillary
to the main instrumental behavior (for example orienting and
approaching). This proposal is part of a literature that tends to
closely associate goal-directed behavior to DMS and to ascribe a
motivational/supportive role to NAcc (Yin and Knowlton, 2006;
Balleine et al., 2007, 2008). Although very relevant, these propos-
als do not fully explain, as our model does, how information on
the ultimate cause of goal selection, namely value, is transmitted
to goals. Equally important, the proposal does not fully explain
where value originates. For example, the proposal does not explain
why, in instrumental devaluation experiments, NAcc is necessary
to allow a rat to decide which lever to press, given two levers
instrumentally associated with two different foods, on the basis
of the value currently assigned to such foods. Moreover, the pro-
posal does not fully articulate how such value, both appetitive and
related to novelty, is generated. Thus it would have difficulty in
explaining why the basolateral amygdala (BLA) is necessary for
the production of the devaluation effects. Our proposal explains
these results and also reconciles them with the functions that
Gruber and McDonald (2012) and similar proposals ascribe to
NAcc. In particular, our proposal claims that: (a) In early stages
of evolution, NAcc learned to play an important role in Pavlovian
processes triggering a number of innate behaviors such as those
related to orienting, approaching, and avoidance (see section 3.1
for details). (b) The NAcc encodes outcome value originating
from different sources with a unique “currency” (namely, the
activation of the representations of the possible outcomes them-
selves). This value representation is intimately related to DA, as
NAcc is one of the main regulators of, and targets for, DA pro-
duction. Such DA production is one of the main physiological
FIGURE 2 | Diagram of the rat brain illustrating a proposal on
the role of DLS to select habits, of DMS to drive goal-directed
behavior, and of NAcc to assign vigor to the performance of
selected behaviors and to trigger ancillary behaviors such as
orienting and approaching. Reprinted with permission (Gruber and
McDonald, 2012).
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correlates of vigor transferred by NAcc to lower-level striatal
regions implementing actions (see section 3.5). (c) With the later
evolutionary expansion of prefrontal cortex (PFC) in mammals
and, hence the potentiation of their capacity to form, represent,
and manage goals, the NAcc has acquired a prominent role in the
assignment of value to such goals; this is the main function of
NAcc expanded in this paper (see sections 3.1 and 3.5). (d) The
goals selected on the basis of these mechanisms then contribute
to select the actions to be performed via the top-down control
exerted by the NAcc-PFC system on the lower-level associative
and sensorimotor striato-cortical systems via cortical and sub-
cortical inverse models (see section 3.6). The DMS plays a key role
in the latter process and in the specification of sub-goals, hence its
importance for learning and expressing goal-directed behavior.
2.2. GOAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIOR: NEURAL CORRELATES
Instrumental goal-directed behavior is supported by both the
activity of cortical regions and the activity of various subcor-
tical neural components. Balleine et al. (2009) summarize the
most important neural regions needed for the acquisition and/or
expression of instrumental devaluation and contingency degra-
dation in rats based on the effect of lesions on the two behavioral
effects. Among these, lesions of the prelimbic cortex (PL; Corbit
and Balleine, 2003), the DMS (Yin et al., 2005), or the mediodor-
sal thalamus (Corbit et al., 2003; Ostlund and Balleine, 2008)
result in a lack of expression of both effects. In contrast, lesions
of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; Ostlund and Balleine, 2007a,b)
or the entorhinal cortex (EC) result in a lack of expression of
contingency degradation alone (but not so in primates where
OFC is important for instrumental devaluation, Izquierdo et al.,
2004; Roberts, 2006). Finally, lesions of the NAcc, in particu-
lar of its core sub-component (NAccCo; Corbit and Balleine,
2003) results in a lack of expression of instrumental devaluation
alone. Importantly, the acquisition and expression of instrumen-
tal devaluation is also disrupted by a damage at the level of the
Amg, in particular the BLA (Balleine et al., 2003; Mannella et al.,
2010).
Our hypothesis must be consistent with the functional impli-
cations of these lesions, and so we now review the empirical
evidence needed to make sense of them. The basal ganglia (BG)
plays a variety of roles in the acquisition and expression of goal-
directed behavior, with different territories of BG supporting this
diversity of functions. There is a wide agreement that one major
function of BG is selection (Alexander et al., 1986; Redgrave et al.,
1999). The functional anatomy of BG reveals an organization
supporting parallel, segregated loops through cortex whose inter-
nal structure is substantially invariant (Figure 3; this pattern is,
however, different for NAcc shells – NAccSh – see below). Each
loop receives the greatest part of its input from a specific cortical
region and projects to the same cortical region via the thala-
mus. Within each loop, a cortical cell assembly associated with a
particular action or another cortical content excites a focussed
part of striatum. This causes inhibition of a corresponding part
of the output nuclei of BG (globus pallidum pars interna—GPi,
and substantia nigra pars reticulata—SNpr) which, in turn, disin-
hibits a restricted portion of the thalamus and the related cortex
(Chevalier and Deniau, 1990). Thus, within each loop, multiple
FIGURE 3 | Internal anatomy of a circuit loop through basal ganglia
and cortex. GPe: globus-pallidus, external compartment; GPi:
globus-pallidus, internal compartment; SNpr: substantia nigra pars
reticulata; STN: sub-thalamic nucleus.
functional channels can select different cortical neural assemblies
associated with action representations or other cortical contents
(Mink, 1996; Redgrave et al., 1999).
There is now a wide agreement that the functional role of the
different BG loops is determined by the contents of the corti-
cal regions they target (Alexander et al., 1986; Romanelli et al.,
2005; Yin and Knowlton, 2006). In this respect, the literature
often focusses on three main striato-cortical loops also relevant
for our hypothesis (Figure 4); note that throughout the paper
we use “striato-cortical loop” as short form for the more com-
plete “striato-pallidal/nigral-thalamo-cortical-striatal loop.” The
first sensorimotor loop, involving DLS, premotor cortex (PMC),
and primary motor cortex (M1), is involved in the selection
of motor actions based on sensory and motor information.
Functionally, this loop plays a key role in the acquisition and
expression of habitual instrumental behavior (i.e., the S-R associ-
ation of Figure 1, Packard and Knowlton, 2002; Featherstone and
McDonald, 2004; Yin et al., 2004.
The second associative loop involves the DMS (in rats; homol-
ogous to caudate in primates) and various associative cortical
areas (e.g., inferotemporal cortex—ITC; Middleton and Strick,
1996), parietal cortex (PC; Cheatwood et al., 2003), and also some
regions of PFC like PL and the frontal eye fields (FEF; Room et al.,
1985; Alexander et al., 1986). Functionally, this loop is involved in
orientation, attention, affordance processing, and working mem-
ory, all functions related to the cortical regions involved by this
loop (Burnod et al., 1999; Hikosaka et al., 2000; O’Reilly and
Frank, 2006; Cisek, 2007). Given this role, the loop has been
involved in learning and storing the relations between actions
and outcomes (Cheatwood et al., 2003; Yin et al., 2005; Yin and
Knowlton, 2006).
In contrast to the other two loops, the function of the lim-
bic loop through BG is less clear. In rats, this loop involves the
NAcc (ventral striatum) and various associative multimodal cor-
tices, in particular the agranular insular cortex (AIC), PL, and
infralimbic cortex (IL). In primates the loop also involves OFC
and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). The loop is involved in the
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FIGURE 4 | The three main striato-cortical loops involving different territories of BG and cortical areas. Reprinted by permission from Macmillan
Publishers Ltd: Nature Reviews Neuroscience (Yin and Knowlton, 2006), copyright 2006.
highest cognitive processes related to goal-directed behavior and
general executive function (Dalley et al., 2004; Hok et al., 2005;
Ragozzino, 2007).
Biobehavioral research has produced a wide range of
data based on lesion experiments, reversible inactivations, or
dopaminergic depletions targeting the NAcc in behaving animals.
These data indicate that NAcc is first implicated in the triggering
of several low-level, fixed motor behaviors and Pavlovian condi-
tioned responses. In particular the NAccCo is part of a network
encompassing the central nucleus of Amg (CeA) and the ventral
tegmental area (VTA). The VTA is one of the two major sources
of DA, the other being substantia nigra pars compacta—SNpc.
SNpc sends DA mainly to DMS and DLS, while VTA sends DA
mainly to NAcc, PFC, Amg, Hip. The Amg-NAccCo-VTA net-
work is the neural substrate of autoshaping, the process through
which animals can be conditioned to perform various innate
behaviors, such as approaching, directed to stimuli predicting
rewards (Parkinson et al., 2000a,b; Cardinal et al., 2002b; see also
Mannella et al., 2009, for a computational model). NAcc has also
been shown to be the root of two effects of Pavlovian associations
on instrumental behaviors, namely instrumental devaluation,
described in section 2.1, and Pavlovian-Instrumental Transfer
(PIT). In the latter, a conditioned stimulus, which has been
previously associated with a reward through a Pavlovian proce-
dure, can facilitate an increase in the execution of a previously
acquired instrumental action directed to the same or to a differ-
ent reward (“specific” or “general” PIT, respectively; Corbit and
Balleine, 2005, 2011). The NAcc also underlies the role of DA in
incentive salience; that is, the motivation to pursue rewards and
sustain efforts to accomplish them (Salamone et al., 2003; Niv
et al., 2007), processes related to “wanting” (Wyvell and Berridge,
2000; Peciña et al., 2006a). NAcc also plays a role in the hedo-
nic perception of taste/rewarding stimuli (“liking”) measured in
terms of specific overt behavioral manifestation (Peciña et al.,
2006b).
Overall, this evidence suggests that the limbic loop plays a
key role in the Pavlovian prediction of, and attribution of value
to, environmental outcomes. Notwithstanding the large amount
of evidence available on these processes, we still lack a specific
proposal on how different types of values are processed and
transmitted to goals to support their selection. Our hypothesis
contributes to clarify these aspects.
2.3. COMPUTATIONAL APPROACHES TO GOAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIORS
In the last decade, the theoretical understanding of habitual
and goal-directed behavior has received a tremendous impe-
tus from machine learning theories on reinforcement learning
(RL), founded on dynamic programming and optimal control
approaches (Bertsekas, 1987; Sutton and Barto, 1998). Since their
inception (e.g., Sutton and Barto, 1987), reinforcement learning
methods have strongly cross-fertilized with the bio-behavioral
research on instrumental and Pavlovian learning (Houk et al.,
1995b), and recently they have become the main theoreti-
cal framework to investigate decision making processes (e.g.,
see Montague et al., 2004; Glimcher et al., 2010). Moreover,
reinforcement learning algorithms, in particular those going
under the banner of temporal difference (TD) learning (Sutton
and Barto, 1998), have become the main modeling tool to under-
stand the dynamics of activation of dopaminergic neurons during
conditioning experiments (Schultz et al., 1997). These models
have also led to an intense effort to identify the specific neural cor-
respondents of the various components of reinforcement learning
algorithms (Houk et al., 1995a; Joel et al., 2002; Botvinick et al.,
2008). These computational accounts have given key insights
into goal-directed learning and behavior and represent touch-
stones against which we should compare the implications of our
hypothesis, so we now review these models in some detail. On
this basis, we will argue that our hypothesis has ramifications
which go beyond the understanding given by current theoretical
models.
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The model of Daw et al. (2005) (Figure 5) is a useful vehicle
to illustrate the links between RL and biology as it also sup-
plies formal definitions of goal-directed and habitual behavior,
and thereby explains the relative strengths of these two modes
of behavior in different conditions. The starting point of their
analysis is the important distinction betweenmodel free reinforce-
ment learning (MFRL) and model-based reinforcement learning
(MBRL). MFRL methods, such as the actor-critic model (Sutton
and Barto, 1987, 1998), are based on the storing of state val-
ues, V(s), the value assigned to state s, and the policy π(a, s)
encoding the probability of executing action a given the state s.
Other MFRL methods, such as Q-learning (Watkins and Dayan,
1992), use the value of state-action pairs,Q(s, a), rather than sim-
ply states alone. In both cases, “value” is formally defined as the
expected sum of future discounted rewards. Value then informs
how to generate the action policy either directly, as in the case of
Q-learning, or indirectly, as in actor-critic methods. Estimates of
the values (V or Q) are updated by the agent acting in the envi-
ronment on the basis of the experienced reinforcement. MFRL
models have been extensively used to capture the processes of
acquisition and expression of habit-based behavior (e.g., see Joel
et al., 2002; Botvinick et al., 2008).
In MBRL, the agent learns a forward model of the dynamics
of the environment, formally captured by a transition function
T(s′, a, s) encoding the probability of visiting a new state s′ when
the action a is performed in state s. The system may addition-
ally model the state-reward contingencies captured by a reward
function R(s) encoding the reward obtained in a given state s.
In contrast, no such explicit knowledge of the world is avail-
able to the agent in MFRL models. The internal representation
of a model of the environment allows a MBRL agents to perform
more powerful computations than MFRL counterparts. Indeed,
using the model, the agent can to some degree evaluate actions
internally, thereby making learning more efficient. Second, the
transition function T is task independent, as it describes the gen-
eral dynamics of the environment, and stable if the environment
is “stationary” (does not change). It may therefore be used to
solve multiple tasks captured by different reward functions. For
example, if the agent is informed of the change of the structure
of rewards it can recompute “on the fly” the values and the policy
without the need of re-sampling the environment.
This flexibility of MBRL has however, some costs: due
to its computational complexity, MBRL does not scale-up to
state/action space domains as large as those that can be dealt with
by MFRL. This complexity of MBRL arises from the memory
needed to store the transition and reward functions, and the time
needed to generate behavior based on the searches of the internal
model. Instead, MFRL methods directly “cache” information on
policies and so they readily indicate the actions to perform.
The processes of MBRL are proposed to be at the core of
goal-directed behavior. In particular, the acquisition of the tran-
sition function is analogous to the learning of action-outcome
associations postulated in contingency degradation experiments.
Moreover, the capacity to reformulate the policy on the basis of
internal simulation of the possible consequences of actions when
the state-values are updated is analogous to the processes taking
place in devaluation experiments, where the change of the value
assigned to states (goals) is immediately reflected in different
overt behaviors.
Daw et al. (2005) also indicate possible brain systems cor-
responding to MFRL and MBRL. In particular, the neural
substrate of MFRL is the network centered on DLS. This is
consistent with experiments showing that lesions of the DLS,
or its dopaminergic afferents, prevents animals from becom-
ing habitual even after over-training (Yin et al., 2004; Faure
et al., 2005). In contrast, the neural substrate of MBRL is
FIGURE 5 | A typical reinforcement learning task under either
(A) goal-directed behavior (“model-based” reinforcement
learning) or (B) habitual behavior (“model-free” or “cached”
reinforcement learning). Reprinted by permission from Macmillan
Publishers Ltd: Nature Neuroscience (Daw et al., 2005), copyright
2005.
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suggested to comprise various cortical (PL, OFC) and sub-cortical
regions (DMS, BLA) important for devaluation effects (see
section 2.2).
Recently, Solway and Botvinick (2012) have proposed to cap-
ture goal-directed behavior processes with probabilistic represen-
tations and Bayesian inference. In this way, different processes
underlying goal-directed behavior can be isolated as terms in
probabilistic expressions and then linked to brain systems imple-
menting analogous functions. In their proposal:
p(π|s, rˆ) ∝ p(rˆ|s,π) · p(π) =
∑
s′, a
p(rˆ|s′) · p(s′|s, a) · p(a|s,π) · p(π) (1)
where rˆ and s′ are respectively future rewards and states, p(π|s, rˆ)
is the posterior probability over the policy given the current state
and the rewards, and p(π) is the prior probability of the policy;
other symbols have been defined earlier.
The terms in Equation 1 were instantiated in the compo-
nents of a connectionist model (Figure 6) linked to possible
corresponding brain areas. Thus, the prior on the policy p(π)
is related to the activity of dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC), the pol-
icy function p(a|s,π) to motor cortices and DLS, the prediction
of states p(s′|s, a) to associative cortex and PFC, and the reward
expectation p(rˆ|s′) to the activity of the OFC and BLA.
The architecture of Solway and Botvinick (2012) offers a prin-
cipled overall view of goal-directed behavior but does not account
for a key element which is at the heart of our hypothesis, namely
the proposal for a key role of the NAcc in the selection of goals
within PFC on the basis information on value computed in the
limbic brain.
The role of NAcc in goal-directed behavior is also the sub-
ject of other computationally-oriented accounts of goal-directed
behavior, all referring directly or indirectly to the reinforce-
ment learning framework (Bornstein and Daw, 2011; Penner and
Mizumori, 2011; Khamassi and Humphries, 2012). For instance,
Penner andMizumori (2011) (Figure 7) invoke a dual actor/critic
framework in which DLS and NAccCo are respectively the actor
and the critic of anMFRL system, while the DMS and the NAccSh
are the actor and the critic of an MBRL system.
In contrast, Pennartz et al. (2011) suggest that the actor-
critic schema is not the best interpretation of NAcc function (see
Figure 8). In their view, different striatal regions compute pre-
dictions on outcomes (or actions) based on different types of
information. Thus, NAccSh predicts outcomes on the basis of
spatial features (e.g., position in space of a certain food resource
in a navigation task). Instead, NAccCo predicts outcomes based
on specific cues (e.g., visible landmarks). The DMS predicts out-
comes based on actions (e.g., the effects of turning right). Finally,
the DLS “predicts” the motor actions, considered as lower-level
abstractions of outcomes.
The computationally grounded ideas described above clearly
represent a major contribution to our understanding of goal-
directed behavior. However, they either overlook the critical
aspect of how goal selection is linked to value, or they diverge
in the way they account for it, so highlighting the need for
FIGURE 6 | A Bayesian interpretation of goal-directed learning
proposed by Solway and Botvinick (2012). (A) Graphical model
supporting the probabilistic factorization of a model-based reinforcement
learning problem, and hence of goal-directed behavior, with a list of
possible biological correspondents. ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; BA,
Brodmann area; BLA, basolateral amygdala; dlPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex; DLS, dorsolateral striatum; MF/PC, medial frontal/parietal cortex;
MT, medial temporal cortex; PFC, prefrontal cortex; PC, parietal cortex;
PMC, premotor cortex; SMA, supplementary motor area; vlPFC,
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. (B) A possible neural implementation of the
functional architecture: based on (A) the reader might attempt to link neural
areas to the components of the architecture. Adapted and reprinted with
permission (Solway and Botvinick, 2012).
further clarifications of this issue grounded on available empirical
evidence.
3. THE VENTRAL STRIATO-CORTICAL LOOP AND GOAL
SELECTION
3.1. A SYSTEM-LEVEL EVOLUTIONARY FRAMEWORK FOR THE
HYPOTHESIS
This section proposes a framework within which we develop
our hypothesis on how the NAcc assigns motivational value
to goals and thereby participates in their selection. Such a
hypothesis is then fully expanded in the remaining sections. We
posit that the system directed to accomplish useful outcomes in
higher mammals results from an evolutionary trajectory involv-
ing three successive “versions” of it having an increasing com-
putational sophistication and power. The additional components
of the more recent versions do not replace those of their pre-
decessors, rather they work with them to produce augmented
functionality.
The evolutionarily first system (Figure 9A) is formed by
two major components: (1) a component capable of learning
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FIGURE 7 | The proposal of Penner and Mizumori (2011) for the
possible functions of nucleus accumbens core and shell, and their
relation to downstream striatal regions. Notice the role of
stimulus-outcome predictor ascribed to the accumbens. Reprinted from
Penner and Mizumori (2011), Copyright 2011, with permission from Elsevier.
FIGURE 8 | An hypothesis of ventral striatum as the locus of various
types of action-outcome anticipations. Reprinted from Pennartz et al.
(2011), Copyright 2011, with permission from Elsevier.
instrumental habitual behaviors by trial-and-error; (2) a second
one capable of forming Pavlovian stimulus-outcome associations.
The neural substrate of the first component is mainly a senso-
rimotor system involving BG motor regions. The substrate of
the second component is mainly formed by a network com-
posed of amygdala, ventral BG and other sub-cortical structures
(e.g., the hypothalamus and the periacqueductal gray) capa-
ble of expressing behaviors which are innate, or the result of
early-development, triggered by Pavlovian processes (Davis and
Whalen, 2001; Medina et al., 2002; Balleine and Killcross, 2006;
Mirolli et al., 2010). The system under discussion is common
to all vertebrates (including fish, amphibians, and reptiles), and
serves the acquisition of simple behaviors through trial-and-error,
the triggering of innate behaviors such as feeding, approach-
ing, avoidance, and orienting, and the implementation of simple
Pavlovian processes such as those studied in delay conditioning
paradigms. None of these behaviors require the maintenance of
lengthy memory traces between the conditioned and the uncon-
ditioned stimuli (Davidson and Richardson, 1970). Within this
system, the ventral regions of striatum mainly support the ener-
gization and expression of innate behaviors via its connections to
lower motor centers.
The second system to emerge (Figure 9B) builds on the first
system, and develops the second component (2) to make it capa-
ble of generating more complex Pavlovian stimulus-outcome
associations. A major contribution to this empowerment, piv-
oting on a fully evolved hippocampus, is the implementation
of dynamical circuits capable of storing information on stimuli
experienced in the recent past. This supports Pavlovian pro-
cesses taking place in the Amg, and thereby allows the solution
of more challenging tasks, such as those involved in trace condi-
tioning paradigms. This enhanced Pavlovian system is possessed
by more evolved vertebrates, e.g., birds, (Lucas et al., 1981), and
allows them to complete more complex tasks where incentive
value has to be transferred between temporally distal stimuli
(Richmond and Colombo, 2002). This allows them to form
conditioned (“secondary”) reinforcers quite distant from actual
rewards and capable of driving the acquisition of sophisticated
habit-like behaviors. In the new enhanced system, the ventral
striatum continues to mainly play a role of energization of action
and triggering of innate behaviors, functions still present inmam-
mals and the third system that we now consider (Cardinal et al.,
2002b; Gruber and McDonald, 2012).
The third, and evolutionarily most recent, system (Figure 9C)
uses the component (1) of its predecessors, has an enhanced com-
ponent (2), and acquires a third component (3). These enhance-
ments pivot on a fully evolved neo-cortex. The enhancement
of component (2) relies on cortical areas such as the AIC and
the OFC, dealing with olfaction and taste, and on prefrontal-
hippocampal re-entrant connections. These allow the compo-
nent to have a further enhanced capacity to represent outcomes
for long times with respect to Amg alone (Schoenbaum et al.,
1998). The third component (3), fully developed in mammals
and in particular in primates, is supported by re-entrant circuits
involving ventral BG, medial and dorsal prefrontal cortex, and
hippocampus, and resulting in a powerful workingmemory capa-
ble of representing experienced stimuli for prolonged periods of
time (up to few seconds) (Rolls, 2000a; Euston et al., 2012). The
component allows the formation of associations betweenmultiple
stimuli in time, and in particular to anticipate future stimuli and
outcomes on the basis of the current experience (Funahashi, 2001;
Dalley et al., 2004;Matsumoto and Tanaka, 2004). The overall sys-
tem has an organization and implements the functions analyzed
in detail in the following sections.
3.2. OUTLINE OF THE HYPOTHESIS
This sub-section outlines the core hypothesis proposed in the
paper. The main features of the hypothesis are shown in
Figure 10. We will continue to refer back to this figure through-
out the rest of the paper as more detail is included in our scheme.
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FIGURE 9 | The three major systems for learning to select desired
outcomes forming an evolutionary lineage used here as a background
for our hypothesis. (A) First system formed by instrumental
stimulus-response behaviors and simple Pavlovian processes. (B) Second
system formed by instrumental stimulus-response behaviors and
sophisticated Pavlovian processes supported by dynamical neural processes
capable of sustained active representations of outcomes. (C) Third system
formed by instrumental stimulus-response behaviors, sophisticated Pavlovian
processes, and further structures allowing outcome representations to recall
actions.
FIGURE 10 | Sketch of the main functional elements of the hypothesis,
with their possible biological correspondents. Amg, amygdala; DLS,
dorsolateral striatum; DMS, dorsomedial striatum; Hip, hippocampus; ITC,
inferotemporal cortex; M1, primary motor cortex; NAcc, nucleus
accumbens; PC, parietal cortex; PFC, prefrontal cortex; PMC, premotor
cortex.
The next four sub-sections expand the biological and behavioral
evidence supporting the hypothesis in relation to the main brain
systems involved (Amg, Hip, NAcc, and PFC).
3.2.1. Amygdala
The Amg encodes unconditioned stimuli (US); that is, appeti-
tive and aversive primary rewarding stimuli. Appetitive stimuli
include, for example, food (e.g., its smell and taste), while aversive
stimuli comprise objects (e.g., predators) causing body damage
and pain. The Amg is one of the limbic brain systems interfac-
ing other brain areas to the homeostatic regulatory systems of
the body. On this basis the Amg can modulate the activation of
its representation of primary appetitive/aversive stimuli depend-
ing on the internal state of the animal. For example, if the
animal ingests a food, its representation within the Amg can
have different activities, hence value, depending on the level of
hunger for such food. The activation of USs in Amg can trigger a
large number of unconditioned responses (e.g., startle, approach,
avoidance), and participates in a number of internal regulatory
functions of the body (e.g., heart-rate, salivation) and the brain
(via the main neuromodulatory systems). These reactions are
made possible by its diffuse projections to multiple subcortical
areas and to the NAcc.
The Amg, in particular CeA, implements core Pavlovian pro-
cesses through which it links representations of CS to innate,
unconditioned responses (URs). Moreover, the BLA can asso-
ciate the representations of CSs to those of USs. This powerful
mechanism allows it to associate, in “one shot,” previously neu-
tral stimuli with all the URs associated with any US following the
CS. Importantly, this implies that, since the responses are medi-
ated by the CS-US-UR causal chain, the BLA can also regulate the
responses on the basis of the current internal value assigned to the
US (see above).
3.2.2. Hippocampus
Hip is traditionally thought to play a key role in rapid forma-
tion of episodic memories and spatial maps for navigation. These
memory-based processes rest on the important capacity of the
Hip system to detect the novelty of stimuli, of stimuli associations,
and of stimuli-context associations. Upon detection of novelty,
the Hip is able to activate dopaminergic systems via its projec-
tions to NAcc, thereby supporting learning of structures targeted
by DA including the Hip itself. This capacity to detect novelty also
plays a second function, fundamental to our hypothesis on the
attribution of value to goals: information on novelty supplied by
Hip to NAcc can also be used to select goals. Indeed, aside from
the appetitive/aversive value communicated to NAcc by the Amg,
the novelty of a stimulus represents a fundamental component of
the motivational value associated to it. This because novelty has
a pivotal adaptive valence since novel objects, associations, and
contexts might have potential appetitive/aversive valence initially
unknown to the animal and this can be discovered only by target-
ing them with the needed attentional, exploratory, and learning
resources.
3.2.3. Nucleus accumbens
The NAcc is a nexus for combining stimulus value computed in
the Amg and Hip, and for implementing the process of selection
of outcomes in synergy with PFC. Thus, NAcc receives informa-
tion from Amg and Hip which represents the appetitive, aversive,
or novelty value of outcomes. At the same time, based on exter-
nal stimuli, working memory, and internal plans, PFC partially
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activates or primes its internal representations of attainable out-
comes offered by the environment. PFC is part of the BG loop
with NAcc, and this loop can mediate the selection of PFC out-
come representations in the normal way via disinhibition of
thalamo-cortical targets. The key, additional mechanism consid-
ered here is that NAcc uses the information on value from Amg
and Hip to strongly bias the selection of specific goals among the
multiple, partially activated outcomes encoded in PFC. The fact
that NAcc activity is also based on value implies that goals with
high value are selected.
The process of selection of goals in PFC is supported in
two ways via the two main sub-components of NAcc, namely
NAccCo and NAccSh. The NAccCo has the typical structure
of the striato-pallidal-thalamo-cortical pathways; it is therefore
NAccCo which mediates goal selection in PFC using the “canon-
ical” basal-ganglia selection process described above. Instead,
NAccSh contributes to the selection of goals in a different but
complementary way, relying on the excitation of DA neurons.
Both NAccCo and NaccSh project directly and indirectly to mid-
brain DA systems (respectively to SNpc and VTA) but the details
of the circuits are different. In this respect, we will show that
likely NAccSh acts in goal selection by exciting DA that in turns
acts at NAccSh, PFC, and other targets including Hip and Amg.
This dopaminergic action facilitates selection so causing a rapid
switching between candidate goals (thereby promoting explo-
ration of different goals when the animal learns to solve new
problems), allows the selection of multiple goals (e.g., goals and
sub-goals forming whole behavioral programmes), and facili-
tates the summation of value from different sources (e.g., related
to appetitive/novelty value and to multiple cues and stimuli
as in PIT).
3.2.4. Prefrontal cortex
Asmentioned above, PFC forms a striato-cortical loopwithNAcc.
It is possible to distinguish three sub-systems within this loop,
each performing a different function related to the anticipation
of action-outcomes and the encoding of goals. The first sub-
system, based on NAcc/AIC connections (in rats; in primates, also
NAcc/OFC connections), contributes to select “ultimate” (dis-
tal) biologically-valuable outcomes, for example “food ingestion.”
These goals are encoded in AIC and OFC in terms of their fea-
tures most closely related to their appetitive aspects, in particular
odor and smell. The second sub-system, based on NAccCo-
PL connections, contributes to select outcomes based on their
more cognitive aspects, such as their visual and auditive aspects.
This system might be particularly important for encoding goals
based on novelty. In primates, this system is also corroborated
by the connections between PL and dlPFC, encoding not only
ultimate goals but also proximal/sub-goals instrumental for the
achievement of ultimate goals and initially not characterized by
an intrinsic biological valence. The third system, mainly based
on NAccSh-IL connections (also NAccCo-IL in primates), plays
the role of avoiding the selection of Pavlovian and instrumental
behaviors which are either no longer useful or even detrimental.
The PFC also exchanges multiple direct and indirect connec-
tions with motor areas and modal sensory associative areas (e.g.,
the ITC and the PC) and uses these connections to implement
sophisticated forward and inverse models that allow it to trigger
the execution of suitable actions directed to pursue the selected
goals.
3.2.5. The functioning of the whole system
We now present an example of how the whole system works refer-
ring to Figure 10. This example gives a first intuition of how the
whole hypothesis works, while several aspects of the functioning
of the various components, and the empirical evidence support-
ing them, are explained in detail in the following sub-sections. In
the example, Amg uses the current perceived state of the world, or
“input stimulus” (e.g., the sight of a lever) to activate an US asso-
ciated to it (e.g., the valuable aspects of food, such as its taste and
odor). We also imagine that the outcome has some novel aspects
(e.g., imagine a food cooked in a novel fashion): this implies that
its representation is strongly active in Hip and this contributes
to increase its value. In prefrontal cortex (PFC) the same input
stimulus (lever) primes a perceptually more sophisticated repre-
sentation of the food outcome (e.g., not only taste and odor, but
also sound/visual appearance of the food). Information on pos-
sible outcomes (PFC), on their appetitive/aversive value (Amg),
and on their novelty (Hip), is integrated in accumbens where
it forms their current saliency. By “saliency” we mean the over-
all activation of an internal representation, based on different
sources of information encoding the current biological relevance
of the represented item for the organism.
The entire process is supported by DA caused by NAcc-
VTA/SNpc and reaching the various components of the system.
Based on saliency, the NAcc-PFC loop selects the outcome in
PFC having the highest saliency, so designating the goal that will
drive action selection. In parallel, the input stimulus also primes
the bottom-up activation of different actions within the DLS-
PMC/M1 loop, but none gets enough activation to be triggered
(e.g., assuming that habits are still not fully formed). However,
the goal now selected in PFC leads to produce a top-down bias
on the DLS-PMC-M1 loop that leads to select and perform the
action that allows its accomplishment.
3.3. THE AMYGDALA: APPETITIVE MOTIVATIONS
The amygdala (Amg) is formed by a group of nuclei acting
as a central hub for the processing of appetitive and aversive
motivational information. An important function of Amg is to
trigger unconditioned behavioral responses (UR; e.g., orienting,
startle, approaching) and to regulate a number of bodily pro-
cesses (e.g., blood pressure, heart rate, salivation), following the
perception of unconditioned stimuli (Davis and Whalen, 2001).
These “primitive” responses are triggered via projections to sub-
cortical structures (Behbehani, 1995; Bandler et al., 2000; Davis
and Whalen, 2001; Balleine and Killcross, 2006). An important
aspect of these responses is that Amg is capable of regulating their
triggering “on the fly” based on the current state of the body
(Hatfield et al., 1996). For example, the reactions of approach
and salivation in response to a foodstuff might be inhibited if
the animal has been previously satiated by that foodstuff. Amg
also plays a key role in Pavlovian processes (Medina et al., 2002;
Balleine and Killcross, 2006). When an animal experiences a neu-
tral stimulus in a stable temporal relation with an “unconditioned
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stimulus” (US; i.e., an unlearned motivationally salient stimu-
lus), Amg is capable of forming Pavlovian associations between
them so that the neutral stimulus becomes a conditioned stim-
ulus (CS). Such Pavlovian associations can be stimulus-specific
or response-specific (Balleine and Killcross, 2006). Two different
groups of nuclei within the Amg are responsible for the two kinds
of associations, respectively the BLA and the CeA (Figure 11).
Lesion and inactivation studies of the BLA reveal that the CeA
supports Pavlovian conditioning in a “US-dissociated” response-
specific way, i.e., it fails to produce the behaviors typical of
devaluation experiments. In particular, after BLA lesion (reveal-
ing the functioning of CeA in isolation), the animal learns to
associate the CS with the same unconditioned responses (UR)
that were associated with the US irrespective of the current value
of the US. For example, a rat responds to a light consistently asso-
ciated to food even if the animal has been satiated for that food
(Hatfield et al., 1996).
In contrast, the BLA can associate a UR to the US representa-
tion so that the Pavlovian response associated with a CS remains
tied to the representation of the US that caused the association
(Hatfield et al., 1996). This process is based on the formation of
links between the neural representations of the CS and US so that
the presence of the CS recalls the internal representation of the
US, including its current motivational value. Thus, changes in
the reward value of the US results in changing the ability of the
CS to recall the Pavlovian responses (Balleine and Killcross, 2006;
Mirolli et al., 2010). The BLA, which can be considered an evolu-
tionarily later, more sophisticated addition to the Amg complex,
can exert important control functions on the activity of the CeA.
In particular, it can affect its activation based on the current moti-
vational value of stimuli in conditions where CeA alone would
be insensitive to this, for example in the case mentioned above
related to the responses to a CS linked to a devalued outcome
(Balleine and Killcross, 2006; Mirolli et al., 2010).
Important for our hypothesis, CeA influences NAcc through
themodulation of VTA dopaminergic neurons (Fudge andHaber,
2000; Fudge and Emiliano, 2003). Both Pavlovian autoshap-
ing and general Pavlovian instrumental transfer depend on
CeA, NAcc, and VTA (see section 2.2 and Corbit et al., 2007).
Interestingly, the influence of the CeA over the NAcc results in
US-dissociated effects as described above (Mannella et al., 2009).
FIGURE 11 | Functional differences between the basolateral amygdala
(BLA) and the central nucleus of amygdala (CeA). CS, conditioned
stimulus; US, unconditioned stimulus; UR, unconditioned response.
The BLA sends to the NAcc one of the major afferent pro-
jection streams received by this area. As noted in section 2.2,
the information conveyed through this pathway is necessary for
the learning and expression of instrumental devaluation (Balleine
et al., 2003). In general, the BLA conveys to NAcc information
about USs and about USs predicted by CSs. Important for our
goal-selection hypothesis, the level of activation of the repre-
sentations of USs (i.e., outcomes) in BLA, which is modulated
by the internal state of the animal as illustrated above and is
communicated to NAcc, encode the value that Amg assigns to
them.
3.4. THE HIPPOCAMPUS: NOVELTY AND THE MOTIVATION TO
EXPLORE
Another major source of projections to NAcc, especially to
NAccSh, is the Hip; Voorn et al., 2004; Humphries and Prescott,
2010). The hippocampal complex comprises several areas charac-
terized by distinct neural organization and computational mech-
anisms (Rolls and Treves, 1998). Among the most prominent,
the enthorinal cortex (EC), relaying information from associa-
tive cortical areas (mainly PFC, PC, and ITC) to the dentate gyrus
(DG) in Hip, performing recoding of its input in sparser form
(thus enabling orthogonality); the CA3 layer of Hip, perform-
ing auto-associative fast memory encoding based on its multiple
re-entrant connections; and CA1 layer of Hip, recoding infor-
mation from the hippocampal system before relaying it (via the
subiculum—Sub, and EC) back to the cortical areas projecting
to Hip.
There is currently a lively debate on the nature of the informa-
tion reaching NAcc fromHip which centers on twomain theories:
one related to the role of Hip for episodic memory and one to its
role in spatial cognition and navigation (see Pennartz et al., 2011
for a review).
Hip plays a pivotal function for the fast, possibly one-shot,
acquisition of integrative memories of “episodes”—specific, con-
textualized experiences (Eichenbaum et al., 1999; Smith and
Mizumori, 2006; Bird and Burgess, 2008). In this respect, space
is only one of several dimensions of the information stored by
Hip. The stored memories last for hours or days (Rolls and
Treves, 1998), and are supported by long term potentiation (Frey
and Morris, 1998). The memories so formed are eventually con-
solidated within most of the cortical mantle with which the
Hip shares important re-entrant connections (McClelland et al.,
1995).
Given these properties, in particular its capacity to quickly
store information about integrated context, Hip also plays a key
role in spatial navigation. This is indeed one of the first and most
studied functions of Hip (O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978; Mulder et al.,
2004; Kumaran and Maguire, 2005). In this respect, evidence
shows that Hip can form “spatial maps”—allocentric represen-
tations of space that allow animals to self-localize and navigate in
space (O’Keefe and Burgess, 1996). This research has also led to
several computational models of how hippocampal projections
to NAcc support path integration and spatial planning. The Hip
also plays a key function in decision making in goal-directed nav-
igation tasks. For example, it has been shown that, at decision
points in a maze, the rat Hip performs “mental simulations” of
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the possible alternative courses of actions and NAcc evaluates the
outcomes (Johnson et al., 2007; Johnson and Redish, 2007; see
Baldassarre, 2002, and Pezzulo et al., 2013, for some models).
In this paper, we propose a third key function of Hip-NAcc
projections, but which is closely related to the role of Hip in
episodic memory. Thus, we hypothesise that Hip-NAcc projec-
tions communicate novelty-related value to NAcc. The literature
on novelty detection in Hip is large (see below) and much of it
considers novelty detection as a process supporting the forma-
tion of episodic memories. The new aspect of our hypothesis is
that we propose that hippocampal novelty detection also serves
a second important function: the assignment of value to goals.
Our proposal is therefore not at odds with the extensive evi-
dence showing Hip mediating episodic memory; rather, it adds
to this previously proposed function by highlighting the unify-
ing function of novelty detection—for episodic memory or value
assignment. To articulate this further, we now first review the rel-
evance of the Hip novelty-detection capacity for memory forma-
tion, and then we expand the idea of how novelty value supports
goal selection.
Novelty detection can be seen as a process required for the for-
mation of episodic memory. An animal is continually bombarded
by a large amount of sensory information, and so the detec-
tion of novelty allows filtering of stimuli and events that deserve
engagement of learning processes. To this purpose, the hippocam-
pal system and surrounding areas (e.g., the perirhinal cortex) are
capable of detecting various forms of novelty, from stimulus nov-
elty to associative novelty and contextual novelty: the literature
on these topics is now very large (see Ranganath and Rainer,
2003, and Kumaran and Maguire, 2007, and for two excellent
reviews).
Novelty detection in Hip might be implemented by a pro-
cess that compares the actual experience with the Hip predictions
or memories, detecting the mismatch between them (Hasselmo
et al., 1995; Lisman and Otmakhova, 2001; Meeter et al., 2004;
Karlsson and Frank, 2008; Van Elzakker et al., 2008). In par-
ticular (Figure 12), it has been proposed that CA1, receiving
input from both EC and CA3, might compare the memo-
ries recalled by CA3 and the “reality” received from EC, and
might detect the novelty of stimuli on the basis of the mis-
match between them. The novelty of an experienced stimu-
lus/event/context does not decay with a single experience but lasts
for the time needed for it to be explored and memorized (i.e., to
become “familiar”).
The Hip is also capable of responding to cues which predict
novel stimuli—so-called “novelty anticipation” (Wittmann et al.,
2007). In this case, stimuli that predict the arrival of novel pat-
terns (e.g., images) activate Hip more strongly and also cause
the dopaminergic system to fire, similarly to what happens with
the anticipation of appetitive rewards. This process might be
important for the assignment of novelty value to cues anticipating
novel outcomes.
FIGURE 12 | Various components of the Hippocampal system underlying novelty detection in Hip, and the consequent production of dopamine via
indirect connections to the VTA. Reprinted from Lisman and Grace (2005), Copyright 2005, with permission from Elsevier.
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We now have the information needed for explaining our
proposal on the role of Hip in assigning novelty-based value infor-
mation to goals via NAcc. The idea is that Hip projections to
NAcc have an effect that goes well beyond the indirect modula-
tion of it via VTA DA signals. In particular, such projections are
fundamental for informing NAcc of stimuli/outcomes/contexts
which have a high novelty-based motivational value and this
information is used by NAcc to select goals related to them.
In this way, novel stimuli/outcomes/contexts become the focus
of attention and exploratory activities are directed at inter-
acting with them. This, in turn, facilitates the agent’s under-
standing of the environmental processes producing the novel
stimuli and of any role the agent might have in their cau-
sation. The adaptive utility of this is that novel objects and
contexts have a high biological valence since they represent
potentially important threats or opportunities. The biological
importance of novelty is clearly shown by the fact that, when
set in a novel environment, hungry animals prefer to explore
the environment before eating available food, and by the close
relation between novelty and fear-related processes (Cavigelli
and McClintock, 2003). Brain imaging evidence shows a strong
relation between the DA-related processes driving exploration
based on novelty and the consequent possible achievement of
rewards (Bunzeck et al., 2012). Having selected a goal based on
its novelty (via the Hip-NAcc-PFC circuit) the accompanying
release of DA in other brain areas (via Hip-NAcc-VTA) pro-
motes the required learning of memories related to it (Lisman
et al., 2011) and agent-environment interactions responsible for
the novelty.
The novelty detection process of Hip also strongly inter-
acts with DA production via NAcc. In this respect, Lisman and
Grace (2005) have proposed an important theory for which
Hip novelty detection modulates the activity of dopaminergic
neurons of VTA via an indirect pathway involving Sub and
NAcc (see Figure 12). According to this hypothesis, novelty
detection in Hip would activate dopaminergic areas project-
ing back to Hip (aside several other cortical and sub-cortical
areas) thereby supporting the formation of memories. Although
DA projections to Hip are rather sparse (Gasbarri et al., 1997),
the DA injected in Hip might nevertheless mediate plastic-
ity to support the memorization of novel stimuli (Otmakova
et al., 2013). In accord with the idea of DA influencing the
formation of memories, it has been shown that hippocampal
input to NAccSh is needed for the expression of the latent
inhibition effect (Peterschmitt et al., 2005; Meyer and Louilot,
2011; Quintero et al., 2011). This effect occurs when Pavlovian
conditioning is substantially slower if the CS has been previ-
ously become familiar for the animal in absence of any reward
(Lubow and Moore, 1959). This is consistent with the idea
that a novel CS detected by Hip causes a release of DA by
activating VTA via NAcc, and this in turn enhances Pavlovian
learning.
3.5. THE VENTRAL STRIATUM: AN INTEGRATOR OF VALUE FOR GOAL
SELECTION
Within the proposed hypothesis, ventral striatum is supposed to
act as a nexus for integrating stimulus value from Amg and Hip,
and using it to bias goal selection in PFC. Amg and Hip are also
directly connected to PFC. These connections are important for the
basic functions explained with respect to the evolutionary per-
spective presented in section 3.1. We now analyze them as this
also allows a better clarification of the different role played by the
connections between those areas when they are mediated by the
NAcc.
3.5.1. The function of the direct connections between
amygdala/hippocampus and prefrontal cortex
The direct connections between Amg and PFC are first of all a
means to enhance Amg-based Pavlovian learning processes via
the working memory capabilities of PFC. This might have been
an important evolutionary step leading to strengthen Pavlovian
processes (Figure 9B). In particular, Amg, AIC (involved in pro-
cessing smell and taste) and OFC (also involved in smell and
taste processing) operate as an integrated system with OFC show-
ing patterns of neural activity similar to those of Amg but
more robust with respect to time delays (e.g., involved in trace
conditioning experiments; Runyan et al., 2004) and complex
situations (e.g., those involving contextual shifts; Schoenbaum
et al., 2003). In section 3.1 we suggested that this system might
have been a way to empower Pavlovian processes in Amg,
and it might have also been a precursor for the emergence of
the more sophisticated functions of PFC in goal management,
especially in primates. NAcc plays an important role in these
enhanced Pavlovian processes, aside its role in goal-selection
illustrated below. In Particular, the NAcc might be an impor-
tant behavioral output gateway of Pavlovian processes thanks
to its connections to sub-cortical structures (e.g., for triggering
basic behaviors such as approaching, orienting, etc., Parkinson
et al., 2000b; Cardinal et al., 2002b; Gruber and McDonald,
2012).
The strong direct connections between Hip and PFC, instead,
allow the Hip-PFC axis to support working memory and plan-
ning functions, thereby forming an integrated system support-
ing the anticipation of possible future states that might fol-
low from the execution of actions in the current state (Fuster,
1997; Frankland and Bontempi, 2005; Bast, 2007). The for-
mation and progressive sophistication of this system has been
an important evolutionary step leading to strengthen the gen-
eral “executive function” of organisms (Figure 9C). The key
aspects of the relation between the two systems are that PFC
can perform reasoning and planning processes by relying on
dynamical mechanisms supporting working memory, while Hip
can quickly form broad associations, e.g., involving multimodal
stimuli and context. Together, the two mechanisms generate
a powerful computational machine for supporting planning,
reasoning, and executive functions (Toni et al., 2001; Bast,
2007).
3.5.2. Anatomy and connections of nucleus accumbens core
and shell
We now consider some features of NAcc internal anatomy, func-
tioning, and external connectivity important for understanding
how different sub-regions of NAcc contribute to select goals in
differential ways. As already noted, it is possible to identify at least
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two subregions within the ventral BG, based on the circuits of
NAccCo andNAccSh. These two circuits differ in cytology, micro-
architecture, and afferent/efferent connections with other neural
regions (Zahm, 2000; Voorn et al., 2004; Humphries and Prescott,
2010).
The BG-cortical loop involving NAccCo reproduces almost the
same cytology and internal organization as the other BG-cortical
loops (see Figures 3, 13), so making it ideal for implementing
selection processes. In particular, NAccCo is connected to the ven-
tral globus pallidus and SNpr, and the latter projects to thalamus
which is in recurrent connectivity with cortex. The ventral globus
pallidus and SNpr are also innervated by the subthalamic nucleus
(STN). Thismicro-circuit involving striatum, STN, pallidum, and
SNpr, has been closely linked with the capacity of basal-ganglia
to perform the selection of the contents of the targeted cortex
(Gurney et al., 2001; Humphries and Gurney, 2002). The corti-
cal areas involved in the loops with NAccCo are AIC and PL in
rats, and also OFC and ACC in primates.
In contrast, the BG circuit involving NAccSh shows some
unique features in terms of both cytology and micro-architecture
(see Figure 13). In particular, VP (medial and ventrolateral
regions) is the only BG output nucleus of the NAccSh which
so has no access to SNpr. Moreover, and importantly, the cir-
cuit has no connectivity with STN, so it is mainly formed by the
FIGURE 13 | Anatomical differences between the basal ganglia circuits
involving nucleus accumbens core and shell. (A) Overall schema of the
connections involving the whole nucleus accumbens. (B) Zoom on the
connections involving the nucleus accumbens shell. (C) Zoom on the
connections involving the nucleus accumbens core. Reprinted from
Humphries and Prescott (2010), Copyright 2010, with permission from Elsevier.
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“direct pathway” of BG but lacks the “indirect pathway” involving
the STN. The latter feature implies that NAccSh cannot per-
form a strong “winner-take-all” selection as it cannot fully inhibit
the non-selected competitive options in cortex (Humphries and
Prescott, 2010; cf. Gurney et al., 2001, on the importance of STN
for BG to perform competitive processing).
In terms of connectivity, in rats NaccSh targets the AIC, the
PL and the IL. IL plays a role in inhibiting instrumental behav-
iors and in the extinction of Pavlovian processes (Quirk et al.,
2000; Coutureau and Killcross, 2003; Rhodes and Killcross, 2004;
Sotres-Bayon and Quirk, 2010). In primates, NAccSh also targets
OFC and ACC.
NAccSh and NAccCo also differ in their relation to midbrain
DA systems (Voorn et al., 2004; Humphries and Prescott, 2010).
Thus, only a subset of NAccCo projection neurons—comprising
the so-called “patch”—project to DA neurons in SNpc. DA pro-
duced by SNpc mainly targets striatum. In contrast, most pro-
jection neurons in NAccSh project to the dopamine neurons in
the VTA. DA produced by VTA mainly targets NAcc, Amg, Hip,
and PFC. In both NAccSh and NAccCo, the relevant parts of VP
project with GABAergic (inhibitory) synapses to their respective
DA systems. Critically, in the circuit with NAccSh there is no exci-
tation of VP from STN (see above) and this might lead NAccSh
to regulate DA differently with respect to NAccCo, as explained
below.
3.5.3. Dopamine and goal selection
Dopamine modulation plays an important role in the goal-
selection processes of NAcc, so we now briefly consider the
DA processes that might be more relevant for goal-selection,
in particular the so called dopamine transients happening at a
time-scale of seconds. Dopamine can be produced at differ-
ent times scales by different causes, and plays different func-
tions within the targeted areas. Tonic DA release is caused by
the removal of inhibitory constraints affecting spontaneously
active dopaminergic neurons (Floresco et al., 2003; Floresco,
2007). The resulting DA concentrations within the targeted
areas are commonly measured through microdyalisis at a time-
scale of minutes and even hours. Tonic DA has a pivotal role
in enhancing the performance of motor behavior, as shown
by the impairment of motor behavior in Parkinson patients
after its decrease in sensorimotor regions of striatum (Redgrave
et al., 2010). Related to this, tonic DA has been linked to
the disposition to sustain efforts in pursuing goals (Salamone
et al., 2003). Tonic DA at very slow time scales has been also
related to the experience of stressors (see Cabib and Puglisi-
Allegra, 2012, for a review). Based on this type of evidence,
tonic DA has been proposed to be regulated on the basis of
the obtained average reward and to mediate the vigor with
which actions are performed (Niv et al., 2007). Phasic DA release
results from a direct glutamatergic excitation of dopaminer-
gic neurons having a duration at the time scale of millisec-
onds. There is a large agreement that phasic DA plays a key
role in learning processes. In particular, a main proposal is
that phasic DA reflects reward prediction errors (Schultz et al.,
1997; Schultz, 2002) and guides trial-and-error learning pro-
cesses within BG (Houk et al., 1995a). Phasic DA has alternatively
been proposed to be caused by sensory prediction errors caused
by unexpected phasic events, and on this basis to drive the
formation of actions (Redgrave and Gurney, 2006; see Mirolli
et al., 2013, for a computational model that reconciles the two
proposals).
The recent introduction of fast-scan cyclic voltammetry
(FSCV) shows that extrasynaptic DA concentrations can also
change at a time-scale of seconds and subseconds (dopamine tran-
sients; Robinson et al., 2003). One possible cause of DA transients
is the spreading of burst firing activity in a large population of
dopaminergic neurons in a spontaneous active state (Floresco
et al., 2003). Such magnified bursts result in a large dopaminergic
efflux that might overflow outside the synapse into the extracellu-
lar space. Studies using FSCV show that DA transients are evoked
by salient appetitive, aversive, and novel stimuli (see Horvitz,
2000, for a review). For instance, Roitman et al. (2004) show that
subsecond DA signaling acts in the NAcc as a real-time modulator
of food-seeking behavior. Other studies show that the production
of DA transients can be caused by novel stimuli (Rebec et al., 1997;
Robinson and Wightman, 2004; Robinson et al., 2011). Here we
propose that DA transients might have a relevant role in goal
selection as they have the suitable time scale. In particular, they
are slow enough to affect selection processes happening within
BG (while single phasic DA bursts might be too fast for this). At
the same time, they are fast enough to affect the selection of dif-
ferent goals in time (while the dynamics of tonic DAmight be too
slow for this purpose).
Establishing the specific effects of different DA levels on goal
selection is not easy. Dopamine (especially phasic, see above)
might indirectly affect the selection of actions by guiding the
history of the reinforcement learning processes that result in a
certain behavior. Dopamine (especially tonic, see above) might
also regulate the overall “selection mode” over long periods of
time, e.g., by energizing or depressing decision making in the
presence of appetitive or aversive/stressing conditions. The liter-
ature is now investigating a more direct causal role of DA levels
in decision making, in particular when a choice between dif-
ferent options is requested. For example, Morris et al. (2006)
found a close link between DA levels and the choice of dif-
ferent actions leading to a reward with different probabilities.
However, they also argued that, due to its diffused and unspe-
cific nature, DA can only reflect decisions once they have been
taken elsewhere. Aside the effect of DA on decisions through
learning, McClure et al. (2003) have proposed a direct effect of
DA levels on the probability of selection of actions reflecting
“incentive salience,” or “wanting,” i.e., the motivation to per-
form the action directed to gain a reward anticipated by a cue
(Berridge, 2004, 2007). Below, we propose specific mechanisms
through which DA might affects goal-selection processes hap-
pening within NAccCo and NAccSh that in part reconcile these
positions.
3.5.4. Different role of nucleus accumbens core and shell in PIT
NAccCo and NAccSh play differential roles in Pavlovian to instru-
mental transfer processes (PIT): these are relevant to under-
stand the differential role they play in value-based goal selection.
Section 2.2 already illustrated that there exist two forms of PIT,
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the general PIT (gPIT) and the outcome-specific PIT (osPIT).
NAccCo and NAccSh have dissociated roles in gPIT and osPIT
(Corbit et al., 2001, 2007). In particular, evidence based on lesions
shows that NAccCo is necessary to have devaluation and gPIT, but
not osPIT (Corbit and Balleine, 2011). In contrast, NAccSh is nec-
essary to have osPIT but not devaluation and gPIT. These results
are somewhat surprising. Indeed, while the relevance of NAccCo
for devaluation seems to indicate its sensitivity to the value of dif-
ferent goals and hence in their selection, its role in gPIT seems to
indicate a role in producing general effects of action energization.
At the same time, while the lack of relevance of NAccSh for deval-
uation seems to indicate no role for the differential selection of
goals, its role in osPIT seems at odds with this. In what follows,
we describe a possible resolution of this apparent impasse.
3.5.5. Role of nucleus accumbens core in goal selection
The evidence presented above allows us to propose an hypoth-
esis on how NAccCo and NAccSh might contribute to select
goals within PFC in complementary ways. As mentioned above,
NAccCo, which shares a selection circuit with the rest of BG, is
able to take part in selecting the contents of the cortex within the
striato-cortical loop to which it belongs, namely PFC (Humphries
andGurney, 2002; Gurney et al., 2012). The cortical targets within
these loops are at least of two types (Fuster, 1997): (a) the rep-
resentations of the rewarding aspects of outcomes (e.g., visceral,
gustative, olfactive) encoded in AIC and OFC; (b) the repre-
sentations of more abstract aspect of outcomes (e.g., visual and
auditive) received from the outer world and encoded in PFC
regions such as PL. All these features of goal representations are
the subject of selection supported by NAccCo.
We propose that the PFC contains partially activated rep-
resentations of possible future outcomes primed by perceived
environmental conditions on the basis of PFC capacity to reason
on future states. These patterns of activity project to neurons in
NAccCo where they are integrated with the information of value
fromAmg andHip to form ameasure of overall level of activity or
salience. Information of value plays a key role in theNAccCo selec-
tion as this is also targeted by Amg and Hip inputs (O’Donnell
and Grace, 1995; Finch, 1996). In particular, information on the
appetitive/aversive value of stimuli received from Amg, and on
their novelty value received from Hip, is encoded in NAcc on the
basis of the “common currency” of saliency. In this way, Amg and
Hip are able to bias the selection of outcomes on the basis of value.
Salience of outcomes is at the base of the selection that NAccCo
performs through the competitive processes also common to the
rest of BG (Redgrave et al., 1999) and for which inputs with
larger salience are selected (Gurney et al., 2001). The mechanism
of selection in one BG loop governed by a biasing input from a
source outside the loop is a common theme in some of our quan-
titative models of BG selection (Lewis et al., 2011; Baldassarre
et al., 2012; Shah et al., submitted).
The term “bias” in general connotes a linearmixing of salience
components and it might be argued that sufficiently strong cor-
tical inputs would allow goal selection that could override any
limbic (Hip and Amg), value contribution. However, there is evi-
dence that limbic inputs to NAcc interact non-linearly with their
cortical counterparts, and can in fact gate or veto these inputs
(O’Donnell and Grace, 1995; Goto and O’Donnell, 2002). This
mechanism provides ideal support to the value-based guidance of
goal selection proposed here. So, even if we will continue to refer
to “biasing” of cortical input at the level of NAcc, there will be no
presumption of linear control of salience.
The connections from PFC to NAcc might not only contribute
to the computation of saliency and goal selection, but also to the
formation of the Amg/Hip-NAcc connections that allow Amg and
Hip to assign value to goals in the first place. The idea is as follows.
When rewarding/novel outcomes are first experienced, their rep-
resentations get formed and strongly activated in PFC, for exam-
ple in terms of multimodal visual/auditory features. Information
on these outcomes encoded in PFC is projected back to NAcc.
At the same time, the representation of the rewarding/novel out-
comes are also strongly activated in Amg (e.g., in terms of odor
and smell) and/or Hip (e.g., in terms of multimodal aspects of
the outcome). These would allow the formation of connections
between outcome representations in NAcc and those in Amg and
Hip. In later stages, these connections would allow Amg and Hip
to contribute to communicate the saliency of outcomes to NAcc
so as to bias the selection of specific outcomes primed in PFC (for
a model of some of these processes, see Baldassarre et al., 2012).
This view on the role of NAccCo in selecting goals also agrees
with its role in devaluation experiments. In these experiments
only one goal has a high value while the others are devalued. So,
for example, in a typical devaluation experiment the sight of two
different manipulanda elicits the activation of two possible out-
comes in PFC related to the two foods achievable by acting on
them. However, Amg is able to inform NAcc of the current value
of each of the two outcomes, based on the animal’s internal state
(e.g., satiated for one of the two foods but not for the other) and
so can differentially activate the representations of such two out-
comes in NAccCo. Based on this, NAccCo can bias the selection
of the currently valued goal within PFC.
The role of NAccCo in gPIT might be explained by the fact
that its selections are non-specifically energised by a major efflux
of dopamine to areas downstream of NAcc, e.g., DMS and the
DLS, caused by the central nucleus of amygdala (CeA) via VTA
(Cardinal et al., 2002b). In particular, gPIT experiments involve
only one possible action at a time (vs. two of devaluation experi-
ments). Thus, the presence of an additional conditioned stimulus
recalling an additional appetitive outcome might energise the
selection, and cause a more vigorous performance, of the action
recalled by the selected goal (see Niv et al., 2007 for a review).
So, in gPIT NAccCo contributes to select one specific goal but the
DA produced by CeA via VTA might energise the selection and
performance of the action associated with it.
Dopamine regulates the selection processes of NAccCo as in
other portions of BG. Two distinct sub-populations of neurons
can be distinguished in the striatum, one expressing low-affinity
D1-like receptors and the other expressing high-affinity D2-like
receptors (Gerfen et al., 1990; Floresco et al., 2003; Goto and
Grace, 2005). D1-like and D2-like receptors are more concen-
trated in neurons within respectively the direct and indirect
pathways of BG. Through a differential effect on the two types
of receptors, and hence on the two pathways, higher levels of DA
tend to produce an overall increase of the signal-to-noise ratio so
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sharpening the selection processes happening within the BG and
hence NAccCo (see Gerfen, 2000 for a review and Gurney et al.,
2001 for a computational model).
3.5.6. Role of nucleus accumbens shell in goal selection
We now focus on NAccSh role in goal selection. According to our
proposal, the NAccSh contributes to the selection of goals in a
rather different but complementary way with respect to NAccCo,
in particular by relying on its peculiar regulation of DA differ-
ent from other regions of BG. Both NAccCo and NAccSh project
directly and indirectly to midbrain DA systems—in particular to
SNpc and VTA, respectively (see Figure 13). The direct projection
is GABAergic and so tends to attenuate DA release. The indi-
rect pathway, via VP, will, however, have a net excitatory effect
(as VP is itself GABAergic; Floresco et al., 2003). In the circuit
with NAccCo, the STN sends glutamatergic (excitatory) projec-
tions to VP which enhances its inhibitory effect on DA neurons
in SNpc. STN also receives cortical input, thereby attenuating
the dopaminergic response under cortical control. In contrast,
the components of VP involved in the circuit with NAccSh do
not receive STN input. This means that dopaminergic response
in VTA, under control of NAccSh, is likely to be stronger than
its counterpart in SNpc under control of NAccCo. We there-
fore hypothesise that a major role of NAccSh in processing value
information that arrives there from Amg and Hip is to regulate
dopaminergic tone based on this integrated value. VTA projects
back to both NAccCo andNAccSh, and to areas of PFCwhichmay
be encoding goals, so NAccSh is in an ideal position to regulate
the NAcc-PFC goal selection processes via DA. Interestingly, VTA
dopaminergic projections also reach Amg (Cardinal et al., 2002a)
and Hip (Lisman and Grace, 2005), and so also the activation and
learning processes of these areas are influenced by NAccSh DA
regulation.
We have seen above that the lack of the indirect pathway
of NAccSh prevents it from implementing strong selections.
Together with its important regulation of DA just reviewed, this
implies that NAccSh contributes to goal selection in ways comple-
mentary to the BG-canonical selection of NAccCo. In this respect,
we propose that NAccSh can contribute to augment the saliency
of the goals selected by NAccCo, or to augment the saliency of
multiple goals in parallel, with the support of DA regulation.
Thus, experienced or predicted appetitive or novel stimuli might
lead to enhanced salience of the selected goals, or to a multi-
ple goal selection. The former might be useful to increase the
vigor of the selection and performance of the actions that lead
to pursuit of the selected goal (Salamone et al., 2003; Niv et al.,
2007) given that NAccSh is at the vertex of the “dopaminergic
spirals” involving striatum (Haber et al., 2000). The latter may
instead be useful if multiple goals are hierarchically organised
into distal goals and sub-goals that have to be selected at the
same time, or when the performance of multiple goals is not
in conflict (e.g., “eat and read” at the same time). Moreover,
in situations involving novel and/or problem-solving conditions,
a facilitated selection caused by a higher DA level may lead to
an easier switching between goals in search of possible useful
courses of actions (see Fiore et al., submitted, for a model of this
mechanism).
The ideas outlined above can explain the role of NAccSh in
osPIT experiments. Thus, in a typical osPIT experiment NAccSh
might receive information on the availability of one specific out-
come, for example on the basis of the sight of the lever that
produces it if pressed, and further activate the representation of
such outcome on the basis of a conditioned stimulus previously
associated with it through a Pavlovian training. In this case, the
NAccSh DA control could support a summation of value from
different sources related to the specific outcome resulting in the
osPIT effects. This might also explain why lesions of NAccCo have
no effect on osPIT: in contrast to NAccSh, NAccCo has the same
canonical structure as the rest of BG, and so it can partially select a
goal but not energise its selection beyond a certain level. It might
also explain why lesions of NAccSh have no effect on devalua-
tion: in this case, the standard BG selection performed by NAccCo
is very effective, as one goal is value-charged while the other is
devalued, while the capacity of NAccSh to over-activate specific
selected outcomes is not relevant.
3.6. THE PREFRONTAL CORTEX: OUTCOME REPRESENTATIONS
Wenow consider the fourth and last component of the system, the
PFC, which supports the representation of different behavioral
outcomes which the NAcc works on to select as the goal. Here we
will mainly refer to rats, both in terms of anatomy and function,
because more information on goal-directed behavior is available
for this species. However, most considerations presentedmight be
extended, at a general level, to primates, albeit with caution due
to the differences between PFC in the two species (Preuss, 1995;
Wise, 2008).
NAcc forms loops with different PFC regions originating
from three main sub-systems (Voorn et al., 2004; Humphries
and Prescott, 2010; see also Figure 14). In particular, in rats
NAcc forms loops with: (a) AIC; (b) PL; (c) IL (mainly with
NAccSh). In primates, NAcc forms loops with (a) AIC and
OFC; (b) PL (strongly connected with dlPFC); (c) IL and ACC
(Haber et al., 1995; Chikama et al., 1997; Chiba et al., 2001). We
make two proposals in regard to these anatomical observations.
First, that each set of sub-systems (a–c) has a similar function
in both species, and such function is empowered in primates.
Second, that the three sub-systems have distinct but complemen-
tary roles in goal selection. These proposals are now articulated
further.
System (a) in rats, comprising the NAcc-AIC loop, may imple-
ment goal selection on the basis of the mechanisms presented in
section 3.5. In particular, the loop comprising NAccCo with AIC
might have an important role in selecting distal or “ultimate,” bio-
logically relevant goals such as the intake of food characterized
by particular odors and tastes. The NAccSh-AIC loop might also
contribute to the selection of ultimate goals by regulating their
saliency on the basis of DA (section 3.5). Interestingly, primate
OFC, which is adjacent to AIC, has a function in relation to odor
and taste (Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004; Rolls, 2004a), and is also
in loop with NAcc. We have seen in section 3.1 that OFC and BLA
might form the augmented Pavlovian system of mammals capa-
ble of dealing with delayed outcomes (Schoenbaum et al., 1998;
Rolls, 2004b). The acquisition of the NAcc-OFC loop in primates
might have endowed them with the capacity to perform a more
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FIGURE 14 | Anatomy and connections of nucleus accumbens, basolateral amygdala, hippocampus, and prefrontal cortex. Reprinted from Voorn et al.
(2004), Copyright 2004, with permission from Elsevier.
flexible selection of goals, based on the various sources of infor-
mation received by NAcc, and the dynamic processes relying on
the NAcc-OFC recurrent neural loops (Rolls, 2000b; Frank and
Claus, 2006).
PL is a high-level area integrating various sources of informa-
tion (from the hippocampal system, the PFC and sub-cortical
areas) and on this basis it might form rich representations of
stimuli (Sesack et al., 1989; Condé et al., 1995). The NAccCo-PL
sub-system (b) might therefore support system (a) by selecting
goals on the basis of their more abstract, auditory and visual fea-
tures. Further, in primates, PL might have been augmented by the
more complex dlPFC since, on the basis of its efferent projections,
dlPFC seems to play functions analogous to, but more sophisti-
cated than, those of PL (Vertes, 2004). In this regard, the dlPFC
might encode more proximal sub-goals, i.e., goals in a “means-
to-end” relation with the ultimate, more distal biologically-salient
goals encoded primarily in PL and AIC (Miller and Cohen, 2001;
Saito et al., 2005; Mushiake et al., 2006; see Solway and Botvinick,
2012, for a review).
Turning to sub-system (c), we propose that the role of
the NAcc-IL system, and in particular of NAccSh-IL, is more
subtle. Empirical evidence indicates that IL in rats is impli-
cated in three different classes of behavioral effects. First, its
projections to Amg (Quirk et al., 2003) are needed for the
extinction of Pavlovian behaviors (Quirk and Mueller, 2008;
Pape and Paré, 2010). Second, IL is also involved in the extinc-
tion of instrumental and Pavlovian behaviors (cf. Rhodes and
Killcross, 2004; Peters et al., 2008). Third, IL is implicated in
the switching from goal-directed to habitual behaviors due to
overtraining, possibly via an inhibition of goal-directed behav-
ior (as its lesion reinstates goal-directed strategies in overtrained
rats Coutureau and Killcross, 2003). Overall, these data sug-
gest that the NAcc-IL circuit might mainly contribute to inhibit
Pavlovian, habitual, and goal-directed behaviors. In particular,
the circuit might learn to inhibit Pavlovian reactions that are no
longer useful, thanks to its inhibitory effects on Amg (Quirk and
Mueller, 2008). With respect to instrumental behaviors, either
habitual or goal-directed, when some behaviors are no longer
useful (or even detrimental), NAcc might lead to no longer
select them.
Interestingly, in primates the NAcc-ACC loop might enhance
function (c): ACC is adjacent to IL and, in primates, it might play
a different role from that in rats (where it mainly serves motor
functions, see Cardinal et al. (2002a), similarly to posterior cin-
gulate cortex of primates). Indeed, primate ACC has been shown
to detect the missed achievement of expected desirable out-
comes (Alexander and Brown, 2011). This detection might allow
the NAcc-Acc loop to form inhibitory associations that prevent
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the selection of actions directed to unachievable/undesirable
outcomes, so resulting in an empowerment of primates to inhibit
behaviors in a goal-directed fashion.
Once goals have been selected by the NAcc-PFC system, they
contribute to select the actions that accomplish them. Such
actions are encoded in the systems formed by the sensorimotor
cortical pathways (Cisek, 2007) and selected by the sensorimotor
striato-cortical loops (Alexander et al., 1986; Mink, 1996). From
a computational perspective, goal-based selection of actions per-
formed by these systems is captured by the concept of inverse
model (Gurney et al., 2012). An inverse model is a computa-
tional device that functionally links three elements: the current
state of the environment and the animal, and the desired future
state (the “goal”), with the action that might enable a transition
from the current to the future state. The inverse model allows
the recruitment of the action required to achieve the goal from
the current state. According to the hypothesis proposed here,
goals are mainly encoded in PFC and their value-based saliency
is encoded in NAcc. In contrast, actions, intended as the sen-
sorimotor transformations from proprioception to movements,
are encoded in the neural pathways linking somatosensory cor-
tex (SSC) to M1 (Pavlides et al., 1993; Tokimura et al., 2000).
These actions are afforded by the current state of the environment
(e.g., a lever might suggest “pressing” or “biting” action affor-
dances to a rat). These affordances and the related motor plans
are encoded in dorsal cortico-cortical neural streams (Goodale
and Milner, 1992) linking associative sensory areas, in particu-
lar the PC, to motor areas, in particular the PMC (in turn linked
to M1) (Jeannerod et al., 1995; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004;
Cisek, 2007). The bridge from goal representations to action rep-
resentations is supposedly based on links between PFC and PMC
mediated by SMC (Nachev et al., 2008; Caligiore et al., 2013).
The PFC is also strongly connected to PC which enables it to
help action selection by selecting and modulating the represen-
tations of action affordances (Fogassi et al., 2005; Caligiore et al.,
2010). In summary, cortical inversemodels are formed by cortico-
cortical connections (PFC-SMC-PMC-M1 and PFC-PC-PMC-
M1) linking goal representations (PFC) to action-affordances and
actions (PC-PMC-M1 and SSC-M1).
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposed an hypothesis that explains how the brain
selects goals on the basis of their current motivation value for
the animal. Our hypothesis makes several key advances in our
understanding of goal-directed behavior. First, it proposes a way
for representing value from whatever source (amygdala, hip-
pocampus) in a common currency, namely activity or salience
within accumbens, thereby allowing all sources of value to be
integrated and processed uniformly. This, in turn, allows us to
hypothesise the idea that value, encoded in diverse structures like
amygdala and hippocampus, can operate at the level of accum-
bens, to govern selection of goals in prefrontal cortex. Second,
there are two principal mechanisms by which this process takes
place: (a) biasing or gating specific goal representations in pre-
frontal cortex bidding for selection by the basal ganglia loop with
accumbens core; (b) a somewhat diffuse facilitation of goals ini-
tiated at the level of accumbens shell and controlling release of
dopamine in the shell and in cortex. Our scheme also empha-
sizes that goals encoded in prefrontal cortex recall actions based
on action-outcome contingencies exploited as inverse models.
The pivotal component of the system, the ventral basal gan-
glia (nucleus accumbens), is the nexus between the value-charged
representations in amygdala and hippocampus, and the represen-
tations of possible outcomes or goals in prefrontal cortex. The
amygdala encodes stimuli having the valence of primary rewards
and punishments, and hippocampus is capable of attributing a
different type of valence to stimuli, namely its novelty. A fur-
ther component of the system, developed later in evolution, is the
prefrontal cortex. We proposed that, based on dynamical proper-
ties making them capable of storing information for seconds, key
areas of prefrontal cortex initially evolved to enhance Pavlovian
processes taking place in amygdala, and novelty processing in hip-
pocampus. In a later evolutionary stage, prefrontal cortex became
capable of encoding and selecting goals on the basis of a close
dialog with accumbens.
Since the hypothesis specifies the function of the poorly under-
stood limbic loop through basal ganglia, it also clarifies its relation
to the “downstream” associative and sensorimotor loops. In par-
ticular, the accumbens, for which we have proposed a specific
mechanistic account of its role in goal selection, is at the highest
level of the striato-cortical loops hierarchy (Yin and Knowlton,
2006) and at the vertex of the “dopaminergic spirals” underly-
ing motivational regulation (Haber et al., 2000). Through these
means, accumbens plays a critical role in controlling and trans-
mitting value information to the dorsomedial and dorsolateral
compartments of the striatal hierarchy. This also explains why
neural correlates of value are empirically found in ventral and
DMS (see Balleine et al., 2008, for a review). Together with the
idea that the areas of frontal cortex form whole computational
systems with such basal ganglia districts, this also explains why
several prefrontal cortex areas, most of which involved in goal
selection by our proposal, have been found to activate in decision
making tasks involving the accomplishment of valuable outcomes
(see Knutson et al., 2009, for a review).
The hypothesis also reconciles several empirical findings on
the different possible functions played by the accumbens (sec-
tion 2.2). First, the hypothesis explains why the lesions of the
amygdala and the accumbens core impair goal directed behav-
ior (in particular, instrumental devaluation effects (Balleine et al.,
2003). Indeed, the lesion of amygdala destroys the capacity to
attribute value to goals, while the lesion of accumbens core elimi-
nates the ability to select goals based on value. Second, it explains
why the accumbens has been shown to be involved in motor
functions (see Humphries and Prescott, 2010, for a review). In
this respect, we have proposed that the primitive role of the
accumbens was to support the performance of innate behaviors
triggered by Pavlovian processes, especially those directed toward
the outer world such as “approaching” and “orienting” behaviors
(Cardinal et al., 2002b; Day et al., 2006; Gruber and McDonald,
2012). Building on this function, accumbens later acquired the
capacity to also control instrumentally acquired behaviors via the
selection of goals. Third, the hypothesis explains why accum-
bens plays a key role in “wanting” processes (Berridge, 2004)
and energization of behavior (Salamone et al., 2003; Gruber
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and McDonald, 2012). In this respect, we have proposed that
accumbens selects goals and attributes to them an incentive
value regulated through its connections to the ventral tegmen-
tal area, in turn regulating the amount of dopamine injected in
various key sub-cortical and cortical areas of brain (accumbens
itself, amygdala, prefrontal cortex). Last, the hypothesis repre-
sents also a framework against which to explain the different
functions that accumbens core and shell have in the transfer of
Pavlovian motivational effects to instrumental behaviors (PIT).
In particular, we have proposed that the execution of actions
triggered on the basis of the selection of goals by accumbens
core is affected by the aspecific amplifying effects of dopamine
(aspecific Pavlovian to instrumental transfer effects, Corbit et al.,
2007). In contrast, accumbens shell can cause focussed effects on
the selection of goals (Corbit et al., 2007) thanks to its capacity
to perform an unbounded summation of the incentive salience
assigned to different goals from different sources (in particular,
not only from the same goal but also from condition stimuli
predicting them). Also these processes are affected by dopamine
regulation.
Our hypothesis specifies in biological terms some aspects of
the computational account of goal-directed behavior furnished
by Daw et al. (2005). These authors propose that goal-directed
behavior mechanisms can be captured by model-based rein-
forcement learning models. Our hypothesis specifies, in partic-
ular, one key aspect at the core of these models, namely the
assignment of value to predicted states (outcomes), done by
the amygdala/hippocampus-accumbens axis. Moreover (see sec-
tion 3.6), the hypothesis can also be used to explain the role
played in goal-directed behavior by internal models of the world
(“transition function”), encoded in terms of action-outcome
contingencies (cf. Mannella et al., 2010). Our proposal also fur-
nishes a biologically detailed hypothesis on the brain systems
that might correspond to the formal account of goal-directed
behavior mechanisms presented by Solway and Botvinick (2012).
These authors propose a Bayesian decomposition of the various
processes involved in goal-directed behavior and link them to
possible biological correspondents, but without supplying a view
of how the whole integrated system might work (see Figure 6).
In particular, the links between the biological components relied
upon the relations between the elements of the model rather
than on an analysis of their anatomical connections and func-
tional dependencies based on biological evidence as done here
(see section 3.1).
Finally, our scheme also reconciles various aspects of the other
theoretical/computational proposals. In particular, it explains
why accumbens core has been ascribed the role of actor and/or
critic of model free models (e.g., Pennartz et al., 2011): this was
based on its role in the expression of some motor behaviors, e.g.,
approaching and orienting (see explanation above), and on the
correlation of its activity with the value assigned to ultimate goals,
e.g., food receipt (here explained in terms of the information on
value that amygdala and hippocampus send to accumbens). Our
scheme also explains why the same interpretations attribute to the
accumbens shell the role of critic of model free models: this is
related to the role of shell in weighting the relative importance of
different goals.
How can our theory on the role of hippocapus-accumbens
connections in the assignment of novelty-based value to goals
be reconciled with the proposal of their role in spatial nav-
igation? There are two, possibly complementary, possibilities.
According to the first, in a spatial context which is novel (e.g.,
a laboratory maze) hippocampus will initially respond to novelty.
However, in normal laboratory situations even though the maze
becomes familiar hippocampus will continue to respond because
the outcomes encoded in hippocampus are valuable/rewarding,
or connected to valuable/rewarding ultimate outcomes. A sec-
ond possibility relies on the function of hippocampus as a
temporary memory store. As seen above, hippocampus strongly
responds to novel stimuli. This, and the related neuromod-
ulatory events that follow, cause the Hip to encode those
same stimuli. According to an important view on Hip func-
tion (McClelland et al., 1995; Rolls and Treves, 1998), how-
ever, hippocampus might work as a temporary store and the
information it initially encodes might progressively transfer to
cortex, possibly in an incomplete fashion. The response of
hippocampus to no-longer-novel, but still not fully consoli-
dated, spatial stimuli might so involve the period of trans-
fer of stimuli to cortex. During this period, stimuli encoded
in hippocampus might maintain a potential to be selected as
goals so as to drive their further exploration (although with a
lower priority).
The idea that novelty can be a source of motivation value, as we
propose for hippocampus, is consistent with the novelty “explo-
ration bonus” hypothesis, formalised in computational theories
of reinforcement learning (Dayan and Sejnowski, 1994; Kakade
andDayan, 2002;Wittmann et al., 2007; Krebs et al., 2009). In this
respect, Bunzeck et al. (2012) present evidence based on a brain-
imaging study for which the Hippocampus and dopaminergic
area plays a key role in modulating dopamine fostering explo-
ration much like predicted by the exploration-bonus hypothesis
[see also Niv et al., 2007]. With respect to this hypothesis, our
proposal adds the notion of a direct role of accumbens in biasing
goal selection within the prefrontal cortex based on the novelty of
stimuli and outcomes or cues providing their anticipation.
Throughout this paper we have emphasised the notion of
“decision making” about goals and actions as one which requires
subcortical structures such as the basal ganglia. In contrast to
this, much of the decision making literature emphasises the role
of cortex (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Gold and Shadlen, 2007).
These two views are not at odds with each other if we consider the
relation between perceptual decision making and its translation
into action for response (whether it is in a laboratory task or a
real-world situation). The two views have been brought together
in recent work on decision making and basal ganglia (Bogacz
and Gurney, 2007; Lepora and Gurney, 2012). Essentially, the
idea is that evidence for a decision about a particular percept
is accumulated as cortical activity in high level sensory areas
and that this is used as input into basal ganglia working as a
selection engine for action. Indeed, in some interpretations,
the accumulation itself is mediate by basal ganglia (Bogacz and
Larsen, 2011). In this view, the salience of a goal or action might
be interpreted as evidence for a decision to enact that goal or
action.
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 135 | 22
Mannella et al. Nucleus accumbens as values-goals nexus
The scheme presented here is able to make empirically testable
predictions. One key claim of the model is that the value
attributed to goals is generated by amygdala and hippocampus,
and this value is integrated in NAcc in a “common currency.”
The instrumental devaluation experiments already support the
generation of appetitive/aversive value by amygdala. It would,
however, be possible to manipulate both appetitive and novelty
aspects of outcomes in instrumental experiments: our theory
would predict that both novelty and appetitive aspects of out-
comes are relevant for their selection, and also that there is
a trade-off between the two. Thus, for example, it should be
possible to lesion the accumbens and see if (as we predict)
it is important for selecting novel vs. familiar (neutral) out-
comes as it is for selecting appetitive outcomes with a higher-
value in devaluation experiments. Further experiments might
use two goals with the same appetitive value and different nov-
elty value, and test the behavioral attractiveness of the two
goals.
Other predictions relate to the differential role of accumbens
core and shell in selecting goals. For example, accumbens core
goal selection processes should be less sensitive to dopamine
depletion than those of accumbens shell. This could be tested with
Pavlovian-instrumental transfer experiments.
Finally we make predictions about the function of the NAcc-
prefrontal cortex loops to select goals. It would be possible, for
example, to run instrumental experiments after lesioning pre-
frontal cortex areas such as agranular insular cortex (and/or
orbitofrontal cortex in primates), or prelimbic cortex (and/or
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in primates), or infralimbic cor-
tex (and/or anterior cingulate cortex in primates) and test the
animals with different outcomes that vary in terms of their
sensorial features (e.g., taste/odor vs. visual/auditive features)
which we have proposed are processed separately in those differ-
ent areas.
Notwithstanding the explanatory and predictive power of our
hypothesis, various issues related to it deserve further investiga-
tions in future work. We highlight these issues in the form of a list
of questions:
• What is the dynamical interplay between the novelty and
appetitive/aversive value of stimuli during learning, and in
particular during their passage from novel to familiar?
• What is the specific interplay between the selection processes of
accumbens core and shell, and their interdependencies based
on the direct connections existing between them?
• Is there a quantitative relation between dopamine levels in
accumbens and the importance of goals? What are the specific
mechanisms that support the regulation of such levels based on
the loops existing between accumbens and dopaminergic areas?
• How are representations of outcomes formed in prefrontal
cortex and in accumbens, and how do they get connected
between them and with the representations in amygdala and
hippocampus?
• What are the specific mechanisms that lead to the forma-
tion of action-outcome cortical/sub-cortical inverse/forward
models?
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APPENDIX
Table A1 | Acronyms used in the paper to indicate various
components of brain.
ACC Anterior cingulate cortex
AIC Agranular insular cortex
Amg Amygdala
BG Basal ganglia
BLA Amygdala, basolateral complex
CA1 Hippocampus, cornu Ammonis region 1
CA3 Hippocampus, cornu Ammonis region 3
CeA Amygdala, central nucleus
DG Hippocampus, dental girus
dlPFC Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
DLS Dorsolateral striatum
DMS Dorsomedial striatum
EC Entorhinal cortex
FEF Frontal eye fields
GPe Globus pallidus, external division
GPi Globus pallidus, internal division
Hip Hippocampus
IL Infralimbic cortex
ITC Inferotemporal cortex
M1 Primary motor cortex
NAcc Nucleus accumbens
NAccCo Nucleus accumbens, core part
NAccSh Nucleus accumbens, shell part
OFC Orbitofrontal cortex
PFC Prefrontal cortex
PL Prelimbic cortex
PC Parietal cortex
PMC Premotor cortex
SMC Supplementary motor cortex
SNpc Substantia nigra, pars compacta
SNpr substantia nigra, pars reticulata
SSC Somatosensory cortex
STN Subthalamic nucleus
Sub Hippocamus, subiculum
VTA Ventral tegmental area
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